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The Law and Policy of Refugee Cities: Special
Economic Zones for Migrants
Michael Castle-Miller*
INTRODUCTION
Migration is quickly becoming one of the most pressing issues
of our time. Conflict, persecution, natural disasters, and economic
inequality are driving people from their homes in record numbers.
Meanwhile, traditional responses to mass migration are
becoming increasingly inadequate. Humanitarian assistance and
border policing are ineffective and costly over the long term
because they fail to address the root causes of migration.1 Barriers
to the labor market, both legal and socio-economic, prevent
migrants from contributing to the economic development of the
countries hosting them and force them into dependency.2
Recognizing this, some countries are exploring pragmatic
pathways toward integrating migrants into economies. The special
economic zone (“SEZ”) concept offers one potential path forward.
SEZs are designated areas designed to promote development
through a distinct policy and administrative framework. They can
serve as vehicles for initiating beneficial policies when political
obstacles stand in the way of nationwide reform.
Refugee cities would be a type of SEZ designed to facilitate
migrant integration. They would be special-status jurisdictions in
which displaced people—who would otherwise be barred from
working—can be employed, start businesses, access finance, and
rebuild their lives. Applying principles from SEZs, refugee cities
could help countries benefit from migrants’ presence in a
politically realistic manner. They could also deliver high-quality
infrastructure, foreign direct investment, and improvements to
the business environment.

* Michael Castle-Miller is an international lawyer and public policy consultant who
helps design special jurisdictions for governments and private investors. He is the CEO of
Politas Consulting (www.politasconsulting.com/) and the founder and executive director of
Refugee Cities (www.refugeecities.org/).
1 See infra Section I(A).
2 See infra Section I(B).
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Refugee cities would also serve as a pathway for countries to
come into closer alignment with international law. Under the
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(“Refugee Convention” and “1967 Protocol,” respectively), refugees
are entitled to relatively strong rights regarding property,
employment, and entrepreneurship.3 However, most countries’
domestic legislation falls well short of these rights.
This article explores these gaps to show how refugee cities
could fill them by creating designated areas in which refugee
rights are respected and the policy benefits of migrant integration
are achieved. Part I provides the background of the global
migration situation. Part II discusses the evolution and role of
SEZs. Part III explains the refugee-cities concept and its policy
benefits. Part IV analyzes international and domestic law
pertaining to refugees, including a special focus on Turkey.
I. BACKGROUND OF GLOBAL FORCED DISPLACEMENT
Forced displacement is a growing major global concern. By the
end of 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) reported 65.6 million people were forcibly displaced by
persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations.4
Included in that total are 22.5 million refugees,5 40.3 million
internally displaced persons (“IDPs”),6 and 2.8 million asylum
seekers.7 Moreover, 10.3 million people were forcibly displaced
during 2016 alone, meaning that twenty people were forced to flee
their homes every minute that year.8

3 Protecting Refugees: questions and answers, UNHCR (Feb. 1, 2002), http://www.un
hcr.org/afr/publications/brochures/3b779dfe2/protecting-refugees-questions-answers.html
[http://perma.cc/XY46-Z396].
4 UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2016, at 2 (2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf [http://perma.cc/5CCH-HMCT]. Actual numbers of
displaced persons, including refugees, are probably much higher than the numbers
provided in this section due to the number of people who would qualify as refugees, but are
undocumented and thus not counted in official tallies. See Roger Zetter & Héloïse Ruaudel,
Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment, Part I: Synthesis 11
(KNOMAD Study 2016) (noting, for instance, that the Iranian government estimates 1.4
million to 2 million undocumented Afghans are within its borders, beyond the 979,400
documented refugees, and that there are an estimated 175,000 undocumented refugees in
Venezuela, compared with only 5000 who are documented).
5 UNHCR, supra note 4, at 2. “Refugees” generally includes people who have been
forced to leave their country because of a well-founded fear of persecution and includes
people who fall under the definition of refugee under international treaties, people granted
complementary forms of protection and temporary protection, and people in “refugee-like
situations.” Id. at 56.
6 Id. at 2. “Internally displaced persons” are people who have been forced to leave
their homes but have not left their country. Id. at 56.
7 Id. at 2. “Asylum seekers” are those who have applied for international protection
in a country, but whose refugee status is yet to be determined. Id. at 39.
8 Id. at 2.
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Developing countries hosted a growing majority of the world’s
refugees.9 The top ten refugee hosting countries at the end of
2016 were:
• Turkey – 2.9 million
• Pakistan – 1.4 million
• Lebanon – 1 million
• Iran – 979,400
• Uganda – 940,800
• Ethiopia – 791,600
• Jordan – 685,200
• Germany – 669,500
• Democratic Republic of the Congo – 452,000
• Kenya – 451,10010
Lebanon hosted the highest number of refugees relative to its
population, with one in every six people in the country being a
refugee.11 Jordan (one in eleven) and Turkey (one in twenty-eight)
were the next two highest.12
Fifty-five percent of refugees came from three countries: Syria
(5.5 million), Afghanistan (2.5 million), and South Sudan (1.4
million).13 Syrians also made up the largest number of forcibly
displaced persons (12 million, including 6.3 million IDPs).14 Sixtyfive percent of the Syrian population were forcibly displaced as of
the end of 2016, a higher proportion than any other nationality.15
The year 2017 saw a major surge in Rohingya refugees fleeing
ethnic cleansing campaigns in Myanmar. Between August 25th
and September 30th of that year, over 600,000 Rohingya were
driven out by reported human rights atrocities.16 Bangladesh
hosted approximately 800,000 Rohingya refugees as of October 4,
2017 in refugee camps and makeshift settlements that were
9 Id. (observing that eighty-four percent of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate (14.5
million out of 17.2 million) are hosted in developing countries and twenty-eight percent are
in less developed countries (4.9 million)).
10 Id. at 14–16.
11 Id. at 3.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 6.
15 See id.
16 Rohingya Refugee Crisis, UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis [http://perma.cc/ WKG7-YKNT] (last
visited Nov. 27, 2017); see also Jeffrey Gettleman, Rohingya Recount Atrocities: ‘They
Threw My Baby Into a Fire,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/11/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-atrocities.html (reporting stories of gang rape,
murder, and home burnings from Rohingya survivors).
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straining to provide basic services like water, healthcare, shelter,
and sanitation.17
A. Responses to Refugees
The international response to refugee situations has evolved
over the last several decades. After massive displacement caused
by the Second World War, the newly created United Nations
formed the UNHCR and adopted a treaty, the 1951 Refugee
Convention, obligating member states to respect certain minimum
standards of treatment of refugees. Since then, the UNHCR’s main
objective has been to ensure the international protection of
refugees and to seek permanent solutions to their problems.18
Traditionally, the UNHCR’s focus was on providing
short-term humanitarian aid through emergency shelters, food,
water, and medical care.19 Over time, the UNHCR increasingly
shifted to emphasize “durable solutions” for refugees.20 The three
durable solutions are: voluntary repatriation to the refugee’s home
country, resettlement to a third country, or integration into the
host country.21
However, in recent years, the UNHCR has increasingly
recognized that durable solutions are often only a remote
possibility for refugees.22 Conditions in their home country often
do not improve for many years, making repatriation impossible in
the near future. Only a small portion of the global refugee
population are accepted for resettlement in third countries,23 and
few of the major refugee-hosting countries are willing to
meaningfully integrate refugees into their societies.
As a result, most refugees remain displaced for many years,
often in isolated refugee camps or informal settlements. As of the
end of 2016, 11.6 million refugees (two-thirds of the total) were in
“protracted refugee situations,” generally lasting five years or
more.24 Of that number, 4.1 million people were in refugee
situations lasting twenty years or more.25

Rohingya Refugee Crisis, supra note 16.
OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES, EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 3 (2015).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 4.
21 Id. at 5.
22 UNHCR, supra note 4, at 24.
23 In 2016, 189,300 refugees were resettled into thirty-seven countries. Id. at 3. The
U.S. admitted the largest number at 96,900. Id.
24 Id. at 22. “Protracted refugee situations” is defined as situations where 25,000 or
more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or
more in a given asylum country. Id.
25 Id.
17
18
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To address this reality, the UNHCR has been seeking to
identify new approaches to refugee situations, including
“complementary pathways,” which countries have implemented
when durable solutions are not possible.26 Examples of current
complementary pathways include private sponsorship programs,
labor schemes, family reunification programs, talent registers,
and education programs.27
B. Refugees’ Access to the Labor Market
The vast majority of refugees are prevented from working,
both de jure and de facto.28 In addition to legal restrictions, which
are discussed in Part IV, refugees face restrictive policies and
practices like forced encampment or bureaucratic and expensive
processes for obtaining work permits. 29 They also face
socio-economic barriers impacting the freedom to work and the
ability to assimilate, such as xenophobia and discrimination,
language difficulties, inadequate access to the courts, and lack of
vocational training for refugees who need to develop new skills.30
As a result, most refugees work in the informal sector and under
relatively poor conditions where they have less of a positive impact
on the economy than if they were allowed to work formally.31
These barriers exist despite evidence that allowing refugees,
and other immigrants to work tends to bring significant net
economic benefits to host countries. Over the medium-term to
long-term, refugees tend to raise wages, create jobs, stimulate
commerce, fill gaps in the labor market, and increase cross-border
trade.32 Refugees represent a major underutilized labor force that
could make significant contributions to the economies hosting
them if activated.33 Additionally, work would enable them to
develop skills and capital to facilitate their return to their home
countries and would help advance the UN’s 2030 Sustainable
Development Goals to end poverty and fight inequality.34

Id. at 24, 29.
Id. at 29.
ASYLUM ACCESS & THE REFUGEE WORK RIGHTS COALITION, GLOBAL REFUGEE WORK
RIGHTS REPORT: TAKING THE MOVEMENT FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 5 (2014) [hereinafter
ASYLUM ACCESS].
29 Id.; Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 14–19.
30 ASYLUM ACCESS, supra note 28, at 5; Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 20.
31 Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 26.
32 See, e.g., id.; see also ASYLUM ACCESS, supra note 28, at 8; OECD, Is migration
good for the economy? (May 2014), https://www.oecd.org/migration/OECD%20Migration
%20Policy%20Debates%20Numero%202.pdf [http://perma.cc/345C-LQAL]; ALEXANDER
BETTS ET AL., REFUGEE ECONOMIES: RETHINKING POPULAR ASSUMPTIONS (2014),
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/refugee-economies-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/E5EQ-UBVZ].
33 Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 4.
34 Id.
26
27
28
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II. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES HISTORY AND POLICY FUNCTIONS
An SEZ can be generally understood as a designated
geographic area designed to promote economic development
through a policy and administrative framework that is somehow
different from the typical policy and administrative frameworks
surrounding it.35 The legal and regulatory regime is the most
central aspect to an SEZ; their geographic, administrative, and
infrastructural characteristics are also important, but less so.36
The SEZ concept can include a wide variety of special-status
jurisdictions going by different names from ancient to modern
times, including free trade zones, export processing zones,
freeports, and even semi-autonomous city-states.37
In recent years, new attention is being placed on the role of
SEZs as vehicles for policy and structural transformation, such
as by helping catalyze growth in new industry sectors or
overcoming political roadblocks to beneficial legal reforms. 38
SEZs often also serve as industrial parks by providing facilities,
infrastructure, and services designed to cater to certain types of
businesses.39 However, an increasing number are mixed-use or
urban, in character.40
A. History of Development
Modern SEZs emerged out of several historical precedents.
The island of Delos functioned as a free zone during the Greek and
Roman empires by serving as a place where goods could be stored
and exchanged free of local prohibitions and taxes.41 Medieval and
Renaissance-era city-states, such as those in the Hanseatic

35 See Gokhan Akinci & James Crittle, Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons
Learned, and Implications for Zone Development 2–6, 9–22 (World Bank Foreign
Investment Advisory Service, Working Paper No. 45869, 2008) (referring to SEZs as
“geographically delimited areas administered by a single body, offering certain
incentives . . . to businesses [within it]” and noting how they enhance competitiveness
through special policy, regulatory frameworks, and administration); see also Claude
Baissac, Brief History of SEZs and Overview of Policy Debates, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES
IN AFRICA: COMPARING PERFORMANCE AND LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 23
(Thomas Farole ed., 2011) (defining SEZs as areas where the “rules of business are different
from those that prevail in the national territory,” generally with more liberal policies and
more effective administration); Lotta Moberg, The Political Economy of Special Economic
Zones (2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason University) (defining SEZs as “areas where
a government allows for different rules to apply than the rest of the country”).
36 Baissac, supra note 35, at 24–25 (2011) (observing how some SEZ programs—as in
the case of “single-factory zone” programs—do not even have a designated geographic area;
instead companies can acquire SEZ status while being located anywhere in the country).
37 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 9–12.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Baissac, supra note 35, at 31–32.
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League, had almost complete autonomy from the ruling powers
around them and provided spaces for free trade and commerce.42
Colonial-era chartered territories and trading posts were
independently administered by state-backed private companies.43
Some of these trading posts emerged in the modern era as
prosperous city-states and freeports, including Singapore, Hong
Kong, and Macau.44 These also could be characterized as a type
of SEZ.45
In the early twentieth century, free-trade zones (“FTZs”), or
“free zones,” existed near major international transit points,
offering exemptions from tariffs for trade-related activities,
including warehousing, packaging, sorting, exhibition, and sales.46
In 1934, the United States adopted the Foreign Trade Zones Act,47
which created these types of zones to mitigate the damaging
impact of high tariffs under the protectionist trade policies
prevailing just before and during the early Great Depression
under laws like the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.48 FTZs were deemed
outside the customs territory of the country, which meant
businesses could import foreign products and sell them in foreign
markets duty free, and only pay customs duties if and when
products were sold in the domestic market.49
FTZs evolved in the mid-twentieth century by opening up
more to manufacturing industries, instead of remaining restricted
to trade activities.50 The starkest early example was the Shannon
Free Zone (1959) which applied the FTZ model to a wide area
located next to a major airport and offered ready-built industrial
infrastructure and facilities, dedicated administrative support,
and investment incentives.51
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 14–16 (identifying Hong Kong, Macau, and
Singapore as city-wide freeport SEZs).
46 Baissac, supra note 35, at 32. Notably, however, the FTZ at the Port of Cadiz
included substantial industrial production, even featuring one of the first Ford Motor
Plants in Europe. Id.
47 Foreign Trade Zones Act, 19 U.S.C.A. § 81a (1934).
48 Tariff Act of 1930 (Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act), 46 Stat. 590; see also Baissac, supra
note 35, at 32.
49 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 9, 52; see also, e.g., WORLD CUSTOMS ORG.,
GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMS TERMS 17 (2013) (defining “free zone” as “a part of
the territory of a Contracting Party where any goods introduced are generally regarded,
insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being outside the Customs Territory”);
19 U.S.C.A. § 81c (2003) (describing the U.S. Customs territory as distinct from the FTZs).
50 Baissac, supra note 35, at 32.
51 Id. As another example of a growing openness of FTZs to manufacturing, in 1950,
the United States amended the Foreign Trade Zones Act to allow for manufacturing
activities. Id. However, this did not result in much manufacturing activity until an April
12, 1980 ruling from the U.S. Customs Service changed the formula for calculating the tariff
42
43
44
45
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The Shannon Free Zone model was copied and spread
throughout developing countries under the name “export processing
zone” (“EPZ”) from the 1960s to the 1990s.52 For developing
countries, EPZs were tools for stimulating export-led industrial
development, which boosted employment and labor productivity,
diversified the economy, generated foreign exchange, attracted
foreign direct investment, and facilitated technology transfer.53
EPZs also had an important function as policy incubators—they
served as pilots for trade liberalization in the midst of protectionist
import-substitution regimes, which generally prevailed in
developing countries at the time.54 Over time, EPZ programs grew
increasingly open to a wider range of business activities, to linkages
with local businesses outside the EPZs, and to domestic sales, as
opposed to an exclusive focus on exports.55
China took a monumental step in shaping the nature of SEZs
in the early 1980s, when several local officials sought to boost
economic growth in their jurisdictions by designating areas as
free-market enclaves.56 The idea was an outgrowth of the Open
Door reforms, which began in the late 1970s as a controlled
experiment of market-based reforms.57 In 1980, the country
designated four “special economic zones” (perhaps the first use of
the term now used generically), which spanned large city-sized
areas and granted a wide range of free market policies affecting
finance, labor, foreign investment, and trade.58 Many of these
SEZs, especially Shenzhen, experienced explosive growth in
investment, wages, population, and living standards.59
applied to finished products sold from an FTZ to the domestic market so that domestic parts
and labor were excluded from the value. A Brief History of the U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones
Program, FOREIGN-TRADE ZONE RES. CTR., http://www.foreign-trade-zone.com/history.htm
[http://perma.cc/M8N8-SV89] (last visited Dec. 3, 2017).
52 Baissac, supra note 35, at 33.
53 See generally THOMAS FAROLE & GOKHAN AKINCI, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS (Thomas Farole & Gokhan
Akinci eds., 2011) (evaluating the performance of SEZs in various countries).
54 Id. (describing policy incubation as an important dynamic benefit of SEZs around
the world).
55 Baissac, supra note 35, at 28.
56 Moberg, supra note 35, at 92–93.
57 Douglas Zhihua Zeng, How Do Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters
Drive China’s Rapid Development?, in BUILDING ENGINES FOR GROWTH AND
COMPETITIVENESS IN CHINA: EXPERIENCE WITH SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND INDUSTRIAL
CLUSTERS 1, 8–9 (Douglas Zhihua Zeng ed., 2010) (noting how Chinese Premier Deng
Xiaping referred to the choice to only open certain segments of the economy to the market
as “crossing the river by touching the stones”).
58 Id.
59 Id. As an example, Shenzhen’s GDP grew by fifty-eight percent per year between
1980 and 1984, and its GDP per capita grew from under $100 at formation to over $25,000
in 2016. Shenzhen (Guangdong) City Information, HKTDC RES. (Aug. 30, 2017),
http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Facts-and-Figures/ShenzhenGuangdong-City-Information/ff/en/1/1X000000/1X09VT4H.htm [http://perma.cc/7BB3-KU5G].
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Beginning largely in the 1990s, zones in Latin America
initiated another major shift in the nature of SEZs.60 Whereas
previous zones were primarily government-driven projects, SEZs
began to increasingly rely on private-sector companies to finance,
own, develop, and provide services to users.61 This model has
allowed the state to concentrate its resources on providing
effective regulation, ideally through a dedicated SEZ regulatory
authority that independently performs or coordinates many of the
functions of government in a streamlined fashion.62 In general,
anecdotal evidence suggests that SEZs managed by private-sector
companies or public-private partnerships have delivered higher
quality services and facilities, better social and environmental
outcomes, and higher financial returns at a lower cost than
government-run SEZs.63
B. Function of SEZs
While SEZs can bring static benefits such as employment
generation and foreign direct investment to an area, their greatest
potential is in delivering dynamic benefits, especially long-term
structural transformation, upgrades to domestic economy capacity,
and changes to nationwide policy.64 Examples of countries that
have achieved these dynamic benefits in a very noticeable way
include Mexico, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, China, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Mauritius.65
Many, if not most, SEZs have failed to achieve significant
dynamic benefits; some may have even been counterproductive.
For instance, rather than serving as catalysts of good policy, some
SEZs may have acted as “pressure valves” that allow elites to avoid
or delay nationwide reform by diverting social movements and
isolating their impact to zones.66 Many SEZs impose economic
costs that exceed their benefits, primarily when SEZs rely heavily
on the public sector for financing or operation or on massive tax
It grew from a fishing village of 300,000 people to over fourteen million people today, many
of them young people from rural areas in search of opportunities. See Da Wei David Wang,
Continuity and Change in the Urban Villages of Shenzhen, 4 INT’L J. CHINA STUD. 233,
233–56 (2013). Many of the original fishing villagers became landowners in the city,
profiting from the city’s success. Id. at 246.
60 Baissac, supra note 35, at 37.
61 Id. (noting how this shift was driven by the need to limit government spending and
to regenerate stagnate free zone programs).
62 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 5.
63 Id. at 45–47.
64 See id. at 32; see also THOMAS FAROLE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA:
COMPARING PERFORMANCE AND LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 3–16 (2011).
65 See Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci, Introduction, in SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES:
PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS, supra note 53, at 1, 8; Akinci
& Crittle, supra note 35, at 26, 36.
66 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 4, 34, 42.
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breaks to attract investment.67 Numerous reports have observed
that many SEZs have not performed well at advancing beyond
low-wage/low-skill jobs, stimulating local economic activity, or
promoting labor and environmental performance.68 SEZs have
generally been successful at job creation and access to income for
women, though there have been significant problems with pay
equity, denying women access to attain higher paying positions,
discriminatory working conditions, and sexual harassment.69
SEZs are becoming increasingly important vehicles for
wide-ranging reforms.70 Previously, their primary function was to
reduce tariff barriers between countries.71 Today, with overall
effective tariff rates very low worldwide, their primary value is in
easing other constraints in the investment climate through
reducing unnecessary regulatory barriers, streamlining customs
inspection and compliance procedures, facilitating human
development (especially skills), easing access to investment
approvals and business licenses, delivering reliable infrastructure,
and improving access to work visas for foreign workers.72 Generous
tax incentives no longer offset disadvantages in these areas.73
III. REFUGEE CITIES CONCEPT
The refugee cities concept is an evolution of the SEZ model.
Whereas traditional zones have prioritized tax reductions,
customs exemptions, business registration and licensing, and
similar measures, refugee cities would prioritize migrant
integration.74 In refugee cities, migrants could legally work,
operate their own businesses, access goods and services, have
Id. at 32–34, 39, 45–47.
See, e.g., Sheba Tejani, The Gender Dimension of Special Economic Zones, in
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: PROGRESS, EMERGING CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS,
supra note 53, at 247, 262–72; Int’l Labour Office, Report of the InFocus Initiative on Export
Processing Zones (EPZs): Latest Trends and Policy Developments in EPZs, at 3–9, ILO Doc.
GB.301/ESP/5 (March 2008); Int’l Labour Office, Labour and Social Issues Relating to
Export Processing Zones: Report for Discussion at the Tripartite Meeting of Export
Processing Zones–Operating Countries, at 47, ILO Doc. TMEPZ (1998). However, SEZs may
perform better, in relative terms, than non-zone businesses and performance appears
stronger in privately managed and geographically demarcated SEZs, as opposed to publicly
operated zones and “single-factory” zones scattered throughout the country. Akinci &
Crittle, supra note 35, at 17.
69 See Tejani, supra note 68, at 269–70; see also Int’l Labour Office, Report of the
InFocus Initiative on Export Processing Zones (EPZs): Latest Trends and Policy
Developments in EPZs, supra note 68, at 4–7.
70 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 35, at 6, 42–43.
71 See id. at 13.
72 See id. at 57–58.
73 See id. at 49.
74 See REFUGEE CITIES, REFUGEE CITIES: EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE
THROUGH S PECIAL E CONOMIC Z ONES 4 (Nov. 2016), https://refugeecities.files.word
press.com/2016/11/refugee-cities-concept-paper-november-2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZKR-2AKU].
67
68
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property rights, and enjoy other rights and privileges ordinarily
denied to them.75 Ideally, refugee cities would also include aspects
of well-performing SEZs, such as an effective and efficient
regulatory system, private-sector investment, and trade
facilitation.76 However, they would also go beyond these elements,
offering diverse, multi-use urban areas, support for entrepreneurs
and small-sized and medium-sized enterprises, healthcare,
trauma counseling, education, financial assistance, and other
support in collaboration with international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.77
A. Benefits of Refugee Cities
1. Host Countries
For countries hosting large numbers of refugees, refugee
cities convert a perceived problem into an economic growth
opportunity.78 Since these countries cannot keep migrants outside
their borders for both practical and political reasons, they must
decide how they will handle migrants.79 If they house migrants in
typical camps without economic opportunities, the migrants will
tend to drain public resources and possibly become more prone to
radicalization and violence.80 The migrants will also tend to find
ways to leave or avoid the camps and instead work in the informal
sector “where they have less of a positive impact on the economy
than if they were allowed to work legally.”81 On the other hand,
efforts to allow refugees to work anywhere in the country face
overwhelming political resistance, especially due to the fear that
they will take away employment opportunities from citizens.82
Refugee cities would help countries realize some of the
potential benefits of refugees83 by designating new spaces where

See id. at 6–7.
See id.
See id. at 8.
See id. at 6.
See id.
See generally Rebecca Horn, Exploring the Impact of Displacement and
Encampment on Domestic Violence in the Kakuma Refugee Camp, 23 J. REFUGEE STUD. 356
(2010) (analyzing the connection between refugee camp residents’ structural conditions and
domestic violence); see also BARBARA SUDE ET AL., LESSENING THE RISK OF REFUGEE
RADICALIZATION 3 (2015), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE
100/PE166/RAND_PE166.pdf [http://perma.cc/9KWK-J6ZD] (discussing the connection
between refugee camp conditions and radicalization).
81 REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 6; see also, e.g., BETTS ET AL., supra note 32, at 5.
82 See Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4 (studying twenty countries hosting seventy
percent of the world’s refugees and observing a general reluctance to ease restrictions on
refugees’ ability to work).
83 See BETTS ET AL., supra note 32, at 16–20 (covering the economic benefits of allowing
refugees to enter the labor market).
75
76
77
78
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refugees can work and start businesses, and where new foreign
investment can be brought in, without competing for existing
resources in existing spaces.84 Host populations could also live and
work in the new spaces and benefit from the opportunities and
infrastructure developed there.85
Refugee cities are better tools for accomplishing the goals of
refugee camps. Host countries often use refugee camps to cluster
refugees to facilitate aid distribution, avoid competition for jobs,
and more easily locate and, eventually, repatriate them.86 Camps
often do not accomplish this goal well, however, since refugees
often avoid them because of the few economic opportunities
there.87 Refugee cities can reverse this trend by attracting
migrants rather than repelling them.88
2. International Community and Aid Agencies
Refugee cities can also offer the international community a
more cost-effective response to refugee crises than existing
humanitarian methods. International organizations traditionally
respond to mass migration with food aid, tents, water, basic
security, and emergency medical care.89 Refugee cities would offer
these services, while also creating a platform for migrants to
become self-supporting.90 Private capital can be invested in real
estate, businesses, and infrastructure and can generate returns
from these productive assets.91 Donor institutions can simply
facilitate and abet this investment through technical support,
investment guarantees, and monitoring and evaluation.92
For developed countries, such as in Europe, that are weary or
fearful of migrants passing through refugee hosting countries and
entering their territory, refugee cities could provide refugees with
other attractive areas for settling.93 Rather than attempting to
find opportunities in an advanced economy, they can find
opportunities in the countries hosting them.94

See REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 6–7.
Id. at 4.
See MILICA Z. BOOKMAN, AFTER INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REFUGEE ENCAMPMENTS 134–36 (2002).
87 Id. at 98.
88 See REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 6.
89 See U.N. ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, EVALUATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 4 (2015).
90 See REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 3.
91 See id. at 1, 4.
92 See id. at 7.
93 See id. at 6.
94 See id. at 4.
84
85
86
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3. Benefits for Businesses and Investors
Refugee cities can also open up new markets and
underutilized talent pools for foreign and domestic investors.95
Refugees and other migrants are perhaps often among the most
motivated and enterprising workers,96 and yet their abilities are
normally withheld from the labor force.97 Businesses in a refugee
city could benefit from their abilities, as well as from other
regulatory and business environment reforms introduced from the
SEZ concept.98
4. Benefits for Refugees
Most importantly, refugee cities allow migrants themselves
an often-rare opportunity to benefit themselves and their families
through their own work.99 They can earn income, experience the
psychological benefits of meaningful work, and, perhaps, help
rebuild their home countries from a better position than if they
had lived in a refugee camp.100
B. Progress
Significant strides are being made toward developing
migrant-inclusive SEZs or refugee cities. Several projects I have
consulted on are, as of the date of publication, underway in Africa
(primarily the transit countries of Northern Africa) with support
from European governments desiring to provide alternatives for
migrants who are otherwise seeking refuge and opportunity
within Europe.
Jordan has also made significant strides toward developing
migrant-inclusive SEZs. In 2016, Jordan formed a trade
agreement with the European Union that intends to attract
EU-oriented investors to Jordan’s SEZs in order to employ both
Syrians and Jordanians.101 The agreement grants manufacturers
in eighteen of Jordan’s industrial zones concessionary access to the
European common market if at least fifteen percent of their

See id. at 7.
See, e.g., Personal Income of Migrants, Australia, 2009–10, AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF
STATISTICS (June 9, 2017, 11:30 AM), http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/3418.0
[http://perma.cc/3C8X-VW8U] (analyzing economic activities of humanitarian migrants in
Australia and observing above-average rates of income and entrepreneurship).
97 See Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 4.
98 See REFUGEE CITIES, supra note 74, at 4.
99 See id. at 8.
100 See id.
101 See European Commission Press Release IP/16/2570, EU-Jordan: Towards a
Stronger Partnership (July 20, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2570_en.htm
[http://perma.cc/V778-NCKP].
95
96
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employees are Syrian refugees.102 The agreement covers fifty-two
product groups and will last for ten years.103
Also, in 2016, the World Bank launched a $300 million
Program for Results Loan to improve Jordan’s investment climate,
attract investment, implement labor market reforms, and allow
the Syrian labor force to further Jordan’s economic growth.104
There is a special focus on supporting trade facilitation,
investment promotion, and Syrian entrepreneurship activities in
existing SEZs.105 Disbursements are linked to transparency
requirements ensuring compliance with good labor practices.106
Jordan set a global target of bringing 200,000 Syrian refugees
into the formal labor market and began issuing work permits free
of charge to Syrians for a three-month period.107 It also removed
the requirement for holding a valid passport to obtain a work
permit, a requirement that was impossible for many Syrians to
fulfill.108 Instead, Ministry of the Interior identification cards now
serve as a substitute for a passport.109
The King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area (“KHBTDA”),
one of Jordan’s SEZs, has been identified as a strong option for
allowing refugees access to the labor market.110 KHBTDA is
located nearby the Za’atari refugee camp in Mafraq, which houses
roughly 80,000 Syrian refugees.111
IV. LAW APPLICABLE TO REFUGEES
The laws applicable to refugees depend on the countries in
which they find themselves. International law pertaining to
refugees is relatively well-developed; however, the strongest
rights are conferred under treaties to which countries may or may
not be a party. Even if they are parties, the countries may have

102 Id. (stating that after three years, the threshold will rise to twenty-five percent, and
the agreement modifies the rules of origin applicable to qualifying products so that they are
eligible for the same benefits applied to least-developed countries under the Everything but
Arms Agreement).
103 Id.
104 See The World Bank Group, Jordan – Economic Opportunities for Jordanians and
Syrian Refugees Program-for-Results Project, at 1–3, Report No. 108201-JO (Sept. 2, 2016),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/802781476219833115/pdf/Jordan-PforR-PADP159522-FINAL-DISCLOSURE-10052016.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GQ3-DJZ5].
105 Id. at 5.
106 Id. at 82.
107 Id. at 4.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Bethan Staton, Jordan Experiment Spurs Jobs for Refugees, NEWS DEEPLY:
REFUGEES DEEPLY (July 25, 2016), https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2016/
07/25/jordan-experiment-spurs-jobs-for-refugees [http://perma.cc/7M7D-GBWW].
111 Id.
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made reservations regarding certain provisions, thereby limiting
their applicability.
Domestic legislation varies greatly across countries. In most
cases, it falls well short of international law, particularly in those
countries hosting most of the world’s refugees. Migrant-inclusive
SEZs, or refugee cities, could help countries move significantly
closer to alignment with the standards under international law in
designated areas.
This Part analyzes both international law and domestic law.
Regarding domestic law, it provides a general overview of
countries hosting large refugee populations and then takes a more
specific look at the law pertaining to refugees in Turkey—the
largest host of refugees.
A. International Law
While certain standards are enshrined in customary
international law and in general treaties regarding humanitarian
law and human rights (such as the Geneva Conventions), the most
specific and protective sources of international law pertaining to
refugees is the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.112 States that are parties to the Refugee Convention are
obligated to certain minimum standards of treatment toward
refugees within their borders.113 To qualify as a “refugee” entitled
to protection under the Convention, a person must be outside the
country of his or her nationality and unable to avail him-or-herself
of the protection of that country114 because of a well-founded fear
of persecution “for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”115
112 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/v1crs.htm [http://perma.cc/KV3T-5BBF] [hereinafter 1951
Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/v2prsr.htm [http://perma.cc/8NXC-JDQG].
When the 1951 Refugee Convention was adopted, it only applied to people displaced by
events occurring before January 1, 1951 (i.e., because of World War II). 1951 Refugee
Convention, art. 1(A)(2). Furthermore, states had the option of either applying it only to
people displaced from events in Europe or from anywhere in the world. Id. art. 1(B)(1).
However, the 1967 Protocol amended the 1951 Convention by removing the date restriction.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1.
113 See generally 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112 (providing wide-ranging
obligations regarding the treatment of refugees).
114 Id. art. 1(A)(2). Stateless persons are also protected. For them, “country of his [or
her] nationality” is effectively replaced with country of his or her place of habitual
residence. Id.
115 Id. There are certain types of people explicitly excluded from protection under the
Refugee Convention. This includes people who can now receive protection from the country of
their nationality. Id. art 1(C)(5). It also includes people receiving assistance from agencies of
the UN other than the UNHCR. Id. art 1(D). For example, Palestinian refugees who receive
assistance from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (“UNRWA”). UNHCR, Revised Statement on Article 1D of the 1951 Convention (Oct.
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There are 145 states party to the Refugee Convention.116
Among those members hosting the largest numbers of refugees as
of the end of 2016 are Turkey (2.9 million),117 Iran (979,400),118
Uganda (940,800),119 Ethiopia (791,600),120 Germany (669,500),121
Democratic Republic of Congo (452,000),122 and Kenya (451,100).123
Notable non-members of the 1967 Protocol with large refugee
populations include: Pakistan (1.4 million),124 Lebanon (1 million),125
and Jordan (685,200).126 Additionally, Bangladesh, which began
hosting a sudden influx of Rohingya refugees in the last half of
2017, is not a party to the Refugee Convention.127
The Refugee Convention contains several provisions that are
relevant to the refugee cities concept, including rights to property,
work, residency and movement, and administrative facilities.
These are discussed below.
1. Rights to Property
First, refugees have the right to property. Article 13 requires
states to “accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as possible
and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens
generally in the same circumstances,128 as regards the acquisition
of movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining
thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and
2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4add88379.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q7UV-3Q9Z]. War criminals and
others who have committed serious non-political crimes are also not protected. 1951 Refugee
Convention, supra note 112, art. 1(F).
116 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112. There are 142 countries party to both the
Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Id. The United States is a party to the 1967
Protocol only. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112.
117 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 14.
118 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 15.
119 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 15.
120 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 15.
121 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 15.
122 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 16.
123 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112; see also UNHCR, supra
note 4, at 16.
124 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112 (not listing Pakistan
as a state party); see also UNHCR, supra note 4, at 14.
125 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112 (not listing Lebanon
as a state party); see also UNHCR, supra note 4, at 15.
126 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112 (not listing Jordan
as a state party); see also UNHCR, supra note 4, at 15.
127 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 112 (not listing
Bangladesh as a state party).
128 For the meaning of “in the same circumstances,” see infra note 135.
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immovable property.”129 Consequently, if a country generally
allows aliens within its borders to purchase land, own shares of
stock in a company, or lease real estate, it must also allow refugees
this same right.130
Treatment “not less favourable than that accorded to aliens
generally” does not include rights that are only given to aliens by
legislative reciprocity,131 nor treatment conferred because of
special economic and customs agreements between nations. 132
Therefore, refugees can only enjoy those rights that are accorded
to aliens in the absence of reciprocity requirements or special
agreements.133 However, many commentators consider the right
to acquire movable and immovable property as now recognized
by customary international law, which would make refugees
entitled to the right even if the country’s laws condition the right
upon reciprocity.134
2. Rights to Work
Secondly, refugees have the rights to work and to operate
their own businesses. These rights are included in Articles 17, 18,
19, and 24 of the Refugee Convention.
Article 17 of the Refugee Convention covers wage-earning
employment. It states in the first paragraph that “[t]he
Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in
their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to
nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances,135 as
regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment.”136
Commentators assert that “wage-earning employment” includes
all kinds of employment that are not self-employment or a “liberal

1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 13.
Atle Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951: Articles 2-11,
13-37, art. 13 (Oct. 1997), www.unhcr.org/3d4ab5fb9.pdf [http://perma.cc/V7UW-9X7Y].
This article includes the right to receive compensation in the case of expropriation, which
is now enshrined in customary international law as well. Id.
131 That is, rights conditioned on the alien’s home state conferring similar rights. Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 “In the same circumstances” is understood as including any requirements (such as
to length and conditions of residence) that aliens would have to fulfill to enjoy the right in
question, except for those requirements that a refugee is incapable of fulfilling by virtue of
being a refugee. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 6. So, requirements such as
education, examinations, membership in associations, length of residency, financial
solvency, etc., that are generally imposed on aliens would need to be fulfilled by refugees
as well. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 6, cmt. 3. However, for requirements the
refugee is incapable of fulfilling, such as, potentially, the inability to produce a certificate
of nationality or to produce a certificate of graduation from a university in the home state,
the state must provide other means of satisfying the requirements. Id.
136 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 17.
129
130
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profession” (two categories treated in Articles 18 and 19,
respectively), including work in factories, agriculture, offices, sales,
domestic work, and virtually all other industrial or service sector
occupations, including state employment.137
The standard of “most favourable treatment accorded to
nationals of a foreign country” goes beyond the standard expressed
for property rights (at least as favorable as treatment “accorded to
aliens generally”).138 It requires states to give refugees the same
rights regarding employment as are given to any other aliens, even
if they are given in the context of a special relationship with
another state or under international agreements.139 The purpose
of this requirement, as expressed by the French delegate to the
Convention, was to not deprive refugees of the support that could
have only been obtained by the work of their home government,
since refugees, by their very nature, are denied such support.140
On its face, this paragraph would appear to give refugees the
same rights to receive work permits or visas as any other alien.
Refugees would be subject to the most lenient requirements and
standards for such permits or visas as are imposed on foreign
nationals from other countries.141 This would include work visas
that are otherwise only issued on the basis of reciprocity.142
Refugees would benefit regardless of whether their own
government issues such visas or permits.143
The second paragraph of Article 17 goes further by requiring
states to exempt refugees from “restrictive measures imposed on
aliens or the employment of aliens for the protection of the
national labour market” if they have completed three years’
residency in the country or if they have a spouse or children who
are nationals of the country.144
This paragraph has its origin in earlier conventions
pertaining to refugees in 1933 and 1938, in which similar
paragraphs were drafted, despite the economic depression at the
time—a period in which lawmakers became especially concerned
with protecting nations’ jobs for their own nationals.145 It was felt
that such restrictions should not apply to refugees who had a
Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmt. 4.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 17.
139 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmt. 3.
140 UN Economic & Social Council, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, First Session: Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting, REFWORLD (Feb. 6,
1950), http://www.refworld.org/docid/40aa1cc34.html [http://perma.cc/4JNB-MXFK].
141 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 17.
145 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmts. 1, 5.
137
138
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special link to their country of refuge. 146 Based on his reading of
the history of this paragraph, commentator Grahl-Madsen
asserts that the requirement of three years’ residency is to be
interpreted as broadly as possible, even including individuals
who have not had the status of refugees for the entire period of
their residence, individuals whose presence has not been legal,
and individuals who have spent short periods travelling or
visiting other countries.147
The second paragraph only lifts restrictions that intend to
prevent competition for domestic jobs.148 Measures that restrict
employment of foreign nationals for other purposes, such as
national security, are not affected by this paragraph.149
The third paragraph of Article 17 requires states to “give
sympathetic consideration” to giving refugees the same right to
wage-earning employment as nationals, especially refugees who
came to the country as part of labor recruitment programs or
immigration schemes.150 This provision obligates governments to
undergo a good faith process in which they consider fully
integrating refugees into the nation’s labor market.151 It does so
with extra force if the country attracted the refugees under the
promise of having the right to work.152
The effect of Article 17 is that states must place refugees on par
with the most favorably treated foreign nationals when it comes to
the right to employment—or better, if the refugees have lived in the
country for three years or have a spouse or children who are
nationals.153 In this latter case, the refugees are not held back by
restrictions imposed on the employment of foreign nationals for the
purpose of preserving jobs for the country’s own citizens.154 States
must also favorably consider fully assimilating refugees into their
labor market, giving them national treatment.155
Article 18 extends similar, but slightly different, rights to
self-employed refugees. It requires states to:
[A]ccord to a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable
as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to

League of Nations Doc. G.A. C.2/1933 (1933).
Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmt. 7.
148 Id. art. 17, cmt. 5.
149 Id.
150 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 17(3).
151 J AMES H ATHAWAY, THE R IGHTS OF R EFUGEES U NDER I NTERNATIONAL L AW
763 (2005).
152 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 17, cmt. 12.
153 Id. art. 17.
154 Id.
155 Id.
146
147
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aliens generally in the same circumstances,156 as regards the right to
engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts, and
commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies.157

The range of activities covered under this provision is the
broadest possible.158
The term “lawfully in their territory” does not include the
“staying” component that is in other articles using this phrase,
such as was seen in Article 17.159 This suggests that short-term
visitors and persons merely travelling through the state are
covered, provided they are refugees and their presence is legal.160
Additionally, the standard of treatment is potentially lower
than the standard for wage-earning employment in Article 17. It
is the same as was observed for the right to property: “[A]s
favourable as possible . . . [but] not less favourable than that
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.”161
Therefore, if the country generally allows aliens to be self-employed
in the absence of reciprocity or special arrangements with other
states, the country must grant the same rights to refugees.
Article 19 provides similar rights to refugees in “liberal
professions.”162 States must “accord to refugees lawfully staying in
their territory who hold diplomas recognized by the competent
authorities of that State, and who are desirous of practicing a
liberal profession, treatment as favourable as possible and, in any
event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in
the same circumstances.”163
According to Grahl-Madsen, the term “diploma” is to be
understood as “any degree, examination, admission, authorization,
completion of course which is required for the exercise of a
profession,” such as admission to the bar (for lawyers).164 The term
“liberal profession” is intended to include persons who act on their
own in an occupation that requires certain qualifications, such as
an advanced degree or license.165 Lawyers, doctors, dentists,
engineers, architects, and probably scientists would be included.166

156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

For the meaning of “in the same circumstance,” see supra note 135.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 18.
Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 18, cmt. 4.
Id. art. 18, cmt. 2.
Id.
Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 13(II).
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 19(1).
Id.
Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 19, cmt. 3.
Id. art. 19, cmt. 4.
Id.
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Finally, Article 24 requires states to extend to refugees
many of the same labor and social security protections as
nationals. This includes covering them under any laws or
regulations dealing with remuneration, work hours, overtime,
holidays, child labor, apprenticeship and training, work-related
injury, maternity, sickness, disability, and unemployment. 167
3. Residency and Movement
Third, refugees have rights pertaining to residency and
movement within the territory. Article 26 requires each state
party to “accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to
choose their place of residence and to move freely within its
territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens
generally in the same circumstances.”168
The right to choose a residence and to move about freely is
distinct from the right to employment in Articles 17–19. To the
extent that the country limits rights to employment to certain
areas, that would not technically affect the right of refugees to
move throughout the country or settle outside those areas, even
though it might do so in practice. 169 Conversely, if the country
requires aliens generally to only reside or travel in certain
areas, this would also apply to refugees, even if they have the
technical right to be employed anywhere in the country in
accordance with Article 17.170
4. Administrative Facilities
Fourth, states are required to provide administrative
assistance to refugees. Article 25 obligates states to arrange for
administrative assistance to be provided to refugees when they
would normally only be able to obtain that assistance from a
foreign country. 171 This includes documents and certifications
like birth, marriage, and death certificates, affidavits, and
divorce judgements (or substitute instruments); it also includes
broader forms of assistance, such as correspondence,
investigations, and counselling.172

1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 24.
Id. art. 26.
Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 26, cmt. 5 (observing that “in so far as there are
restrictions on the freedom to seek whatever employment one might desire, the right to
choose one’s place of residence may be restricted in fact though not in law”).
170 Id. art. 26, cmt. 6 (describing situations in which immigrants are only admitted on
the condition that they remain in certain regions of the country and how such restrictions
would apply to refugees as well).
171 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 25.
172 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 25, cmts. 1–2.
167
168
169
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Relatedly, Articles 27 and 28 obligate states to allow access
to identity papers173 and travel documents,174 respectively.
Article 34 requires states to facilitate the assimilation of
refugees, to expedite naturalization proceedings, and to reduce
as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.175
Refugee cities can be well-positioned to fulfill these
requirements concerning administrative assistance by adopting
mechanisms employed by SEZs, such as one-stop shops and
special dedicated regulatory authorities. Such mechanisms can
greatly streamline administrative approvals both onsite and
online,176 which would help overcome the procedural burdens and
delays that currently face refugees. 177
5. Additional and Blanket Rights
Other relevant protections in the Refugee Convention
include the right of association,178 free access to the courts, 179
housing,180 education,181 and welfare.182 Several of the
protections for refugees are considered so fundamental and
reaffirmed in other international instruments that they are
considered customary international law. 183 These include

173 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 27 (giving the right to identity papers
to any refugee “who does not possess a valid travel document”).
174 Id. art. 28 (requiring states to issue refugees documents for the purpose of travelling
outside their territory, subject to certain specified exemptions and restrictions).
175 Id. art. 34.
176 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
177 See infra note 207–210 and accompanying text (discussing the bureaucratic
hurdles, costs, and delays associated with refugee status determinations, work permit
applications, and other procedures).
178 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 15 (granting lawful refugees the most
favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country regarding non-political and
non-profit-making associations and trade unions).
179 Id. art. 16 (conferring free access to the courts of law to the same degree as nationals
for refugees who are habitual residents (including legal assistance) and, for non-habitual
residents, to the same degree as nationals of the country of habitual residence).
180 Id. art. 21 (according to lawful refugees “treatment as favourable as possible and,
in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same
circumstances” as regards housing laws, regulations, or other public agency controls).
181 Id. art. 22 (providing refugees the same treatment as nationals as regards
elementary education and “treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less
favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances,” as regards
non-elementary education).
182 Id. art. 23 (securing for lawful refugees the same treatment as nationals as regards
“public relief and assistance”).
183 See UNHCR, Introductory Note by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, in CONVENTION & PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES 3 (2010), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HW3-HDTZ].
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the principle of non-refoulement, 184 non-penalization, 185 and
non-discrimination. 186
Finally, the Refugee Convention contains a requirement for
states to “accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to
aliens generally,” unless other articles require more favorable
treatment.187 This blanket requirement covers all those benefits
that aliens generally might enjoy that are not mentioned in the
Refugee Convention.188 The phrase “aliens generally” means that
the requirement excludes benefits conferred under special
arrangements with other countries or benefits granted on the
basis of reciprocity.189 This would naturally include all those rights
provided under customary international law, such as the right to
leave the territory of the state, protection from confiscation of
property without compensation, and the right to not be expelled
without cause.
Moreover, refugees enjoy any benefits to aliens that are
conditioned on legislative reciprocity after three years’
residence.190 This means that benefits that are only conferred upon
foreign nationals if those individuals’ home states confer similar
benefits on nationals of the other state, are available to refugees,
notwithstanding the refugee’s home state’s policies.
B. Domestic Laws Pertaining to Refugees
Domestic law is typically far more restrictive toward refugees
than the Refugee Convention. Even though many of the countries
hosting large numbers of the world’s refugees are parties to the
convention, few fully apply key rights, especially work rights.
Common concerns supporting these restrictions are the fear that
refugees will decrease the supply of jobs available to citizens,
strain and distort an already weak labor market, reduce wages
and working conditions, encourage refugees to claim citizenship,
and pose security risks.191
184 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 33. “Non-refoulement” is a
prohibition on expelling or returning refugees against their will to any territories where
they fear threats to life or freedom. UNHCR, supra note 183, at 3.
185 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 31.
186 Id. art. 3.
187 Id. art. 7(1).
188 Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 7, cmt. 2.
189 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Grahl-Madsen, however, notes that
reciprocity requirements may not apply at all if the benefits are ones that a country is
prepared to grant to any alien and any number of aliens (as opposed to ones conferred on
the basis of a particularly close relationship), since these are effectively a form of retaliation
against the refugee’s home state, but transmitted through the refugee, who has no power
to affect his home state’s policies. Grahl-Madsen, supra note 130, art. 7, cmt. 5.
190 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 112, art. 7(2).
191 Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at viii, xi.
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Turkey is one example. The vast majority of forcibly displaced
people within it do not meet the technical definition of “refugee”
and thus do not have access to the rights granted by the Refugee
Convention. Nevertheless, Turkey has made progress since the
beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis at modifying its legal
framework to extend more rights to refugees.192 The refugee cities
approach could help advance these efforts.
1. Overview of Domestic Law
The legal framework for refugees in many countries has
weaknesses in terms of the ability to obtain formal status as
refugees and, for those who do obtain refugee status, the
protections conferred to them.193 Inability to obtain formal status
and protection as refugees leaves these individuals, such as
Eritrean refugees in Sudan and Colombian refugees in Venezuela,
vulnerable to roundups, detention, and refoulment.194 Refugees
who are not granted formal status as refugees are sometimes given
other classifications, such as temporary protection.195
Only seventy-five of the 145 states that are party to the
Refugee Convention formally grant refugees the right to work.196
Half of the states have declared full or partial reservations to the
rights to work conferred in Articles 17–19, usually imposing
similar restrictions as states not party to the Refugee
Convention.197 Only a few countries have refugee and labor
legislation that specifically refers to a refugee’s right to work.198
Others, such as Chad, Ecuador, and India, handle refugees under
the same provisions applicable to foreigners generally.199
Many countries impose restrictions on the sectors refugees
can work in. Prohibiting refugees from working in security and
defense, as well as government employment generally, are fairly
common.200 Many countries go further, such as requiring that no
qualified nationals be available to work in the particular sector.201
Other legal limitations supplement restrictions on the right
to work, such as restrictions on owning property, mobility,
See id. at 15, 33.
Id. at 11.
Id. Also noting that failure to make refugee status determinations skews official
counts of refugees because people who would otherwise receive refugee status are often left
undocumented and thus uncounted. Id.
195 Id. at 12.
196 Id. at 4–5.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 12 (noting the United States and Uganda as examples).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 13.
201 Id.
192
193
194
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accessing credit, opening a business, opening a bank account, and
entering into contracts.202 Many countries restrict refugees from
employment-related rights and benefits, such as social security,
unemployment and disability insurance, and general labor rights,
as in the case of stateless Palestinians in Jordan.203
There are exceptions. Uganda’s 2006 Refugee Act provides a
legal framework for refugees that is strongly oriented toward
social and economic integration.204 The Act aligns with the
Refugee Convention and provides freedoms to work, operate
businesses, access courts, receive an education, move and reside
freely throughout the country, and own property. 205 The United
States is similar.206
Beyond legal hurdles, countries’ policies and practices often
impose major constraints on employment.207 There is significant
confusion over where paperwork must be filed and whether
obtaining refugee status is sufficient to work or whether an
additional work permit is required.208
The processes for refugee status determinations, processing
paperwork, and issuing permits and licenses are often slow,
complex, costly, and burdensome.209 In many countries, refugees
must first obtain a job offer from an employer before they can
obtain a work permit, as in Lebanon and Zambia.210 Some
countries are removing or simplifying these hurdles.211 In 2016, for
instance, Jordan provided a three-month period in which it would
waive fees for twelve-month work permits for Syrian refugees, and
Turkey permitted Syrian refugees to apply for work permits if they

202 Id. at 13, 16. For example, Pakistan requires refugees to have a Pakistani partner
in order to own real estate or a business. Id. at 13. Ecuador and Turkey limit access to
financial institutions. Id. Bangladesh prohibits refugees from accessing credit, engaging in
trade, and owning property. Id. Refugees in India and Sudan are prohibited from
purchasing land. Id.
203 Id.
204 See UGANDA: THE REFUGEES ACT 2006 (May 24, 2006), http://www.refworld.org/
docid/4b7baba52.html [http://perma.cc/56G6-UYDF].
205 Id. § 29; Refugee Law Project, Critique of the Refugees Act 3 (2006),
https://www.refugeelawproject.org/files/legal_resources/RefugeesActRLPCritique.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LJ4M-KZXX]; see also WORLD BANK GROUP, AN ASSESSMENT OF UGANDA’S
PROGRESSIVE APPROACH TO REFUGEE MANAGEMENT (2016) (describing and assessing the
impact of the law and policy affecting refugees in Uganda).
206 See Zetter & Ruaudel, supra note 4, at 12–13.
207 See id. at 15.
208 Id. at 12, 15 (observing that in the U.K. and U.S. a work permit is not necessary if
a person has been determined to be a refugee, but noting how many countries are different).
209 Id. at 15.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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were in possession of temporary identity cards and resided in
Turkey for six months.212
2. Turkey
Turkey currently hosts the world’s largest refugee population
at approximately 3.7 million as of 2017, and is a primary route for
Syrians and Iraqis to reach Europe.213 The EU has been providing
substantial assistance to Turkey to stop illegal or informal entry
of these migrants into Europe.214
Turkey is a party to the Refugee Convention, yet
counterintuitively, few, if any, of its refugees are actually
protected by the Convention.215 This unusual situation arose from
the fact that the primary impetus and focus of the Refugee
Convention was the large number of displaced people in Europe
after World War II.216 Therefore, when the Refugee Convention
was adopted, its member states had the option of limiting its scope
to only people displaced by events in Europe or extending coverage
to refugees from anywhere in the world.217 Turkey was one of a few
states that limited its scope to Europe, and expressly continued
this limitation when it adopted the 1967 Protocol.218 As a result,
the only people technically under the protection of the Refugee
Convention in Turkey are those who have fled European nations.
219 Nearly all of Turkey’s refugee population is from non-European
countries, especially Syria and Iraq.220

212 See id. at 15. But see Wendy Zeldin, Turkey, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY IN
SELECTED COUNTRIES 256, 273 (The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research
Center, Mar. 2016) (noting that, in practice, less than three percent of Syrian refugees have
been issued work permits under this policy because they have been deemed “unqualified”).
213 European Commission, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
Operations: Turkey, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/turkey_syrian_
crisis_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/RPN7-TZWA] (last updated Jan. 10, 2018).
214 Id.; see also, e.g., EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan: Implementation Report (Feb. 10,
2016), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/europeanagenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_eu-turkey_
join_action_plan_implementation_report_20160210_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/56MS-XJQ3]
(pledging €3 million in assistance for measures aimed at curbing irregular migration);
Council of the EU Press Release 144/16, EU-Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 2016) (arranging
that for every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, one Syrian will be
resettled from Turkey to the EU).
215 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 256.
216 UNHCR, supra note 183, at 2.
217 See id. art. 1B(1) (providing states the option of interpreting the scope of Article 1
as applying only to persons displaced by events in Europe or in any nation).
218 See UNHCR, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS
OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 5 (Apr. 2015) (observing that Turkey expressly
maintained its declaration of geographic limitation).
219 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 261.
220 Id.
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Nevertheless, Turkey has substantially adjusted its domestic
legislation to protect refugees in recent years and collaborates with
UNHCR.221 The 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection
(“LFIP”)222 extended protections to categories of forcibly displaced
people not meeting the strict Eurocentric definition of “refugee,”
including “conditional refugees” and persons covered under
“subsidiary protection” and “temporary protection.”223 UNHCR works
with the Ministry of the Interior to conduct status determinations and
attempts to resettle refugees into third countries.224 Generally
speaking, the legal framework is geared to prevent integration of
refugees and toward a temporary status, with eventual resettlement
in a third country or repatriation as the goal.225
The LFIP created several classifications into which asylum
seekers can fall. First it created the following classifications of
persons entitled to “international protection status”:
(1) Refugees, which are foreigners who, “as a result of events
occurring in European countries,” cannot avail themselves of
the protection of the country of their nationality or of former
residence because of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion.226
(2) Conditional Refugees, which are foreigners who, “as a
result of events occurring outside European countries,”
cannot avail themselves the protection of the country of
their nationality or of former residence because of a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group, or political opinion.227
(3) Beneficiaries of “subsidiary protection,” which are
foreigners who cannot qualify as a refugee or conditional
refugee, but if returned to their country of origin or former
residence would face the death penalty, torture, inhuman
or degrading treatment, or serious threat of indiscriminate
violence from armed conflict.228
Id.
Law on Foreigners and International Protection (Law No. 6458) (Apr. 4, 2013)
(Republic of Turkey) (unofficial English translation), http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/eng_
minikanun_5_son.pdf [http://perma.cc/KY8Y-H3RW] [hereinafter LFIP].
223 Id. art. 61–63.
224 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 261.
225 As an example, refugees, conditional refugees, and beneficiaries of subsidiary
protection and temporary protection are explicitly exempted from receiving long-term
residence permits. LFIP, supra note 222, art. 42(2).
226 Id. art. 61 (emphasis added).
227 Id. art. 62 (emphasis added).
228 Id. art. 63 (emphasis added).
221
222
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Persons who apply for and receive international protection status
must undergo lengthy procedures and are entitled to several rights
specified in the LFIP.
However, given the realities of mass migration, particularly of
Syrians, and the attendant difficulties of satisfying the procedural
requirements of international protection applications for each one,
the LFIP added an additional category—Temporary Protection.229
Temporary protection status is more immediate than the
categories of international protection and does not involve the
same procedures and rights as the international protection
categories.230 Beneficiaries of temporary protection are those
“foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot
return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or
crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking
immediate and temporary protection.”231
Syrians, who compose the vast majority of asylum seekers in
Turkey, have been placed under temporary protection as a group,
due to the large influx of them in recent years.232 Non-Syrian
asylum seekers are generally processed under one of the
international protection categories by the UNHCR.233
The Temporary Protection status is further defined in the
Temporary Protection Regulation.234 Beneficiaries of temporary
protection receive basic-needs assistance, including social
services, translation services, IDs, travel documents, access to
primary and secondary education, and the opportunity to receive
work permits.235
People under temporary protection are typically required to
live in designated reception and accommodation centers. These
centers are managed by the Turkish Disaster and Emergency
Management Authority and the Turkish Red Crescent, rather
than by the UNHCR.236 Camps reportedly have markets, reliable
heating, religious services, communications infrastructure,
psychosocial support, banking, and other services.237 Residents are
given three meals a day and electronic cards preloaded with funds
for personal needs.238 Residents are also covered under the
Zeldin, supra note 212, at 261–63.
Id.
231 LFIP, supra note 222, art. 91(1) (emphasis added).
232 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 261–63.
233 Id.
234 Temporary Protection Regulation (Oct. 22, 2014) (unofficial English translation),
http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/temptemp.pdf [http://perma.cc/9V29-HQZ5].
235 Id. art. 26–32.
236 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 270.
237 Id.
238 Id.
229
230
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country’s social security and medical insurance programs.239
Premium payments are at least partially covered by Turkey’s
Directorate General of Migration Management, though recipients
are expected to contribute in full or in part in proportion to their
financial means.240
Asylum seekers have limited access to the labor market.
Persons who apply for international protection, as well as persons
given conditional refugee status, may apply for a work permit six
months after their international protection application was
filed.241 Persons who acquire refugee status or subsidiary
protection status are automatically eligible to work, either in selfemployment or regular employment, with their identity document
substituting for a work permit.242 However, such persons are
subject to the general laws pertaining to foreign workers, which
requires, among other things, for businesses to have at least five
Turkish citizens as employees for every foreign worker.243
Additionally, the LFIP states that refugees’ and subsidiary
protection beneficiaries’ access to the labor market may be
restricted concerning certain sectors, professions, lines of business
or geographical areas for a period when necessary because of “the
situation of the labor market,” “developments in the working life,”
and employment-related “sectoral and economic conditions.”244
However, no such restrictions apply to refugees and subsidiary
protection beneficiaries who have resided in Turkey for three years
or have a spouse or children with Turkish citizenship.245
Persons under temporary protection may similarly apply for
a work permit six months after being registered. 246 In addition to
the general requirements regarding the issuance of work
permits, temporary protection workers cannot make up more
than ten percent of the Turkish citizens employed at a business,
unless the employer can prove there is no qualified Turkish
citizen in the province who can perform the job. 247 In practice, the
government has deemed all but three percent of Syrian refugees
as “unqualified” for work permits because they “do not have an
identity card . . . [and their] professions are unknown.”248
Id.
Id.
LFIP, supra note 222, art. 89(4).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. This exemption from labor market restrictions is analogous to Article 17(2) of
the Refugee Convention, which would apply anyway to refugees. The LFIP extends the
exemption to subsidiary protection beneficiaries. Id.
246 Zeldin, supra note 212, at 272.
247 Id. at 272–73.
248 Id. at 273.
239
240
241
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CONCLUSION
Refugee cities provide a pathway for refugee integration and
alignment with international norms in the face of political resistance
to countrywide integration. They apply the most important feature
of SEZs—their ability to overcome roadblocks to beneficial policy
reforms—to address one of the most pressing global concerns and
help countries benefit from, rather than be burdened by, migrants.
A refugee city would serve as a demonstration area where the
benefits of extending international law pertaining to refugees
would be tested. They would serve as a complementary pathway
that helps achieve the UNHCR’s objective of integrating refugees
into host economies—one of its “durable solutions”—in a
designated geographic area. They would also help realize the
policy benefits of integrating migrants into the formal economy.
Within refugee cities, countries could extend rights to
property that fulfill Article 13 of the Refugee Convention.
Residents of a refugee city could have formal rights to land, such
as a lease, and rights to movable property. At the same time,
countries could address reluctance to make refugees permanent by
setting time limits and expiration dates on leases, business
licenses, or work permits. When the expiration date occurs, the
country will have enabled refugees to return home on a much
better footing then they would have been on otherwise.
Countries could also extend rights to work and selfemployment that match Articles 17–19 of the Refugee Convention.
This would mean refugees would have the most favourable
treatment accorded to foreign nationals, with restrictions designed
to protect the domestic labor market removed for those who have
lived in the country for three years or have a spouse or children
who are nationals. Alternatively, refugees could be placed on par
with nationals, fulfilling the aspirations of Article 17, paragraph 3.
Refugee cities could streamline regulatory functions through
dedicated regulatory authorities and one-stop shops to enable a
more efficient processing of residents’ status determinations and
applications for work permits. These mechanisms would overcome
the current backlog in countries like Turkey and others facing
large refugee influxes. Refugee cities could also fulfill the blanket
obligation to treat refugees with at least the same treatment as is
accorded to aliens generally in Article 7 of the Refugee Convention.
For the developing countries currently hosting the
overwhelming share of migrants, refugee cities would transcend
the traditional refugee camp model. They would be spaces in which
international legal norms align with both political realities and
good policy and drive economic and social progress.

